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Abstract
This paper introduces strategic competition between banks into a standard key-
nesian model. Banks offer horizontally differentiated goods on the two markets
of deposits and loans. At the two symmetric Nash equilibria, the three inter-
est rates (on loans, deposits and bonds) are positively correlated. We study the
effects of the fiscal and monetary policies under two diffrent assumptions : the
central bank pegs the monetary base or it pegs the interest rate. We show that
the model exhibits several non standard results.
Andre´ Grimaud, GREMAQ and IDEI, Universite´ de Toulouse, Place Anatole
France, 31042 Toulouse cedex, France.
Re´sume´
La caracte´ristique essentielle de cet article est de prendre en compte ex-
plicitement la concurrence imparfaite entre les banques a` l’inte´rieur d’un mode`le
keyne´sien standard. Les banques offrent des biens diffe´rencie´s horizontalement
sur les deux marche´s des de´poˆts et des cre´dits. Aux deux e´quilibres de Nash
syme´triques, les troix taux d’inte´reˆt (sur les cre´dits, les de´poˆts et les titres) sont
corre´le´s positivement. L’e´tude des effets des politiques budge´taire et mone´taire
est alors mene´e en conside´rant deux cas : ou bien la banque centrale fixe la base
mone´taire, ou bien elle fixe le taux d’inte´reˆt. Dans chacun des cas, le mode`le
conduit a` des re´sultats non standards.
1 Introduction
Monetary policy influences the economy by the intermediary of the money and
credit channels. Banks are major actors in both channels. On the one hand, they
borrow and lend on the bonds market, on the other hand, they collect deposits
from households and lend to firms. Thus, banks intervene in the determination
of three interest rates (on bonds, deposits and loans) which play an important
role in the monetary transmission mechanism. We study this influence in the
context of a standard Keynesian macro-economic model, under the assumption
that banks are strategic.
The model is presented in section 2. In several respects it is close to Bernanke-
Blinder (1988), the main difference is that we study imperfect competition be-
tween banks in the deposits and loans markets. By explicitly studying imper-
fect competition between banks in a macroeconomic framework, we endeavour
to bring closer standard macro–economic models and the growing literature on
channels of monetary policy (see for instance Bernanke-Gertler (1995)). In stan-
dard macro-economic models, such as IS-LM, there are three types of agents
(households, firms, government) and three goods (output, money, bonds). To
study the strategic behavior of banks, and its consequences on the money and
credit channels, we consider five types of agents (households, firms, government,
banks, and the central bank) and five goods (output, deposits, loans, monetary
base, bonds). Both on the loans and on the deposits markets, banks are assumed
to offer horizontally differentiated goods, and to strategically set interest rates. In
the symmetric Nash equilibrium of this game, the three interest rates (on loans,
deposits and bonds) are positively correlated.
In the following sections of the paper we plunge this Nash equilibrium in
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a macro-economic setting, under two types of monetary policy : pegging the
monetary base or pegging the interest rate.
In section 3 we assume that the central banks pegs the monetary base. This is
similar to IS-LM. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) refer to this model as the CC-LM
model, because the CC curve (along which the two markets of goods an loans
are simultaneously equilibrated) is substituted for the IS curve. In contrast with
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), in the present model, the willingness of households
to deposit their savings at the bank (i.e., the demand for deposits) is assumed to
be increasing in the interest rate served on deposits. This plausible assumption
can lead to surprising results. If the demand for deposits is not very sensitive
to the rate on deposits, the standard results are preserved. As this sensitivity
increases, monetary policy becomes more efficient while the fiscal policy becomes
less efficient. If the reactiveness of the demand for deposits to the interest rate
on deposits is large, the LM curve slopes downward. In this case, the effects of
the monetary and fiscal policies depend on the relative slopes of the IS and LM
curves, and they are non standard. For instance, if LM is less sloped than IS (in
absolute value), an increase in government purchases leads to a recession. And if
LM is more sloped than IS, an increase in the money supply raises the interest
rates and lowers output : there is a liquidity trap effect.
In section 4, we assume that the central bank pegs the interest rate on the
interbank market. Then the monetary base becomes endogenous and the LM
curve disappears. Here also the model exhibits some non standard results. In
particular, increases in government spendings have no crowding out effects on
private spendings since the interest rates are unchanged. In fact the output
expansion leads to the creation of new money by banks. Since this money is
also a new resource for banks, they can lower their borrowings (or increase their
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loans) on the financial market, which can be reequilibrated with an unchanged
interest rate.
2 The model
We consider a closed economy with five types of agents : firms, households, banks,
the central bank and the government. Output Q can be used for consumption C,
investment I and government spending G. Firms can finance their investment
either by issuing bonds Be on financial market or by using banks loans L. House-
holds receive the income Q, pay taxes T , and can hold three assets : currency
Cu, deposits D and bonds Bm. Banks receive households deposits D and must
hold reserves R = τD (τ is the reserves ratio). They lend L to firms. Their (net)
borrowings on financial market are Bb. They directly borrow H from the central
bank on the interbank market. The central bank produces currency Cu, holds
banks reserves R, lends H to banks and can lend Lg to government (seignoriage).
Finally, government can finance its spendings by taxes T , bonds Bg and direct
borrowings from the central bank Lg. We could assume that households directly
borrow from banks to buy durable items and houses. This assumption would
reinforce the credit channel mechanism.
As usual in keynesian short-term models, we assume that the price of the
good is fixed (normalized to one) and that there is an excess supply on the good
market. We could distinguish a first interest rate, rB, on financial market and
another, ρ, on interbank market. Since banks can arbitrage between the two
markets, we assume ρ = rB.
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2.1 Banks
There are n identical banks (j = 1, . . . , n). For each bank j, deposits are denoted
by Dj, reserves by Rj = τDj, net borrowings on the financial market by B
b
j ,
direct borrowings from the central bank by Hj, and loans by Lj.
We assume that deposits Dj and loans Lj are substitute differentiated goods
between banks. For deposits, this assumption seems rather natural because banks
are spatially dispersed, which creates a differentiation due to transportation costs.
For loans, there are many characteristics that lead to differentiation : flexibility
of usage and reimbursement, application procedure, default risk insurance, . . . In
order to formalize this differentiation, we assume that the demand of loans to
bank j is
Ldj = L
d
j ( r
1
L
+
, r2L
+
, . . . , rjL−
, . . . , rnL
+
, rB
+
) (1)
where + and − are the signs of partial derivatives, and where rjL is the interest
rate of bank’s j loans, for j = 1, . . . , n. In the same way, we assume that the
demand of deposits to bank j is
Ddj = D
d
j ( r
1
D−
, r2D−
, . . . , rjD
+
, . . . , rnD−
, rB−
) (2)
where rjD is the interest rate of bank’s j deposits, for j = 1, . . . , n.
Then each bank j chooses interest rates rjD and r
j
B that maximize its profit
pij = r
j
LLj − rjDDj − rB(Bbj +Hj)− CL(Lj)− CD(Dj)
where CL(Lj) and CD(Dj) are costs functions. Since B
b
j +Hj = Lj +Rj −Dj =
Lj −Dj(1− τ), we have
pij = Lj(r
j
L − rB) +Dj((1− τ)rB − rjD)− CL(Lj)− CD(Dj) (3)
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Using (1) and (2) we obtain the following first order conditions
Lj + (r
j
L − rB − C ′L(Lj))
∂Ldj
∂rjL
= 0
−Dj + ((1− τ)rB − rjD − C ′D(Dj))
∂Ddj
∂rjD
= 0
where C ′L(Lj) and C
′
D(Dj) are marginal costs.
Denoting by jj =
−∂Ldj
∂rjL
rjL
Ldj
and ηjj =
∂Ddj
∂rjD
rjD
DjD
the direct price elasticities of
loans and deposits demand, these conditions can be rewritten
rjL − rB − C ′L(Lj)
rjL
=
1
jj
(4)
and
(1− τ)rB − rjD − C ′D(Dj)
rjD
=
1
ηjj
(5)
To obtain simple results, we assume that the functional forms of demands
Ldj () and D
d
j () are the same for all banks
1. In the same way, we assume constant
marginal costs : C ′L(Lj) = hL and C
′
D(Lj) = hD. Then we can consider the two
symmetric Nash equilibria on the two markets for loans and deposits. Denoting
by  and η the elasticities of loans and deposits demands, we obtain from (4) and
(5) the two equilibrium interest rates2 :
rL =
rB + hL
1− 1/ (6)
and rD =
(1− τ)rB − hD
1 + 1/η
(7)
These results show how the competition betweeen banks leads to a positive
correlation between the three interest rates on loans, deposits and bonds.
1This assumption is usually made in the standard differentiation models, as for instance
Hotelling or Salop.
2If we consider that loans and deposits are two homogeneous products and that banks
are price takers on these two competitive markets, (6) and (7) become rL = rB + hL and
rD = (1− τ)rB − hD.
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2.2 Firms and households
Firms produce the output Q which is used for consumption C, investment I and
government spendings G. Since they can finance their investments either from
financial markets or from banks loans, we assume that I is a decreasing function
of interest rates, namely
I = I( r1L−
, . . . , rjL−
, . . . , rnL−
, rB−
) (8)
Moreover, the demands of loans to any bank j is given by (1) (see above).
If all the interest rates of loans are equal (rjL = rL,∀j), which is the case in
the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we assume that investment I is given by3 :
I = I( rL−
, rB−
) (9)
In the same case, the total loans demand Ld =
∑n
j=1 L
d
j is given by :
Ld = Ld( rL−
, rB
+
) (10)
Households receive income Q from firms, and their consumption is :
C = C( Q− T
+
) (11)
where T are taxes.
They hold three assets : currency, deposits and bonds. We assume that these
assets are substitute in their portfolio. More precisely, if all the interest rates
on deposits are equal (rjD = rD,∀j), which is the case in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium on deposits market, we have
3For instance, it is an implicit assumption in Bernanke-Blinder (1988). More generally, I
could represent housing and durable expenditures. See for instance Mishkin (1995).
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Cu = Cu( Q
+
, rD−
, rB−
) (12)
and D = D( Q
+
, rD
+
, rB−
) (13)
Remark : in a more standard way, we could assume that the total demand of
money Md = Cu+D is a function of Q, rD and rB. For instance we could assume
Cu+D = M
d( Q
+
, rD
+
, rB−
) with Cu = cMd, and thus D = (1−c)Md, 0 < c <
1. This formulation would lead to the usual monetary base mutiplier. On the
contrary, under assumptions behind (12) and (13), there is no constant multiplier
between money Cu+D and base M0 = Cu+R = H + L
g.
2.3 Equilibria
There are five goods to the model : output (Q), deposits (D), loans (L), monetary
base (M0 = Cu + R), and bonds (B). Using the Walras law, we can eliminate
bonds and we obtain the four following equilibrium equations :
Q = C(Q− T ) + I(rL, rD) +G
rD =
(1− τ)rB − hD
1 + 1/η
rL =
rB + hL
1− 1/
M0 = H + L
g = Cu(Q, rD, rB) + τD(Q, rD, rB)
After substitution for rD and rB, this leads to
Q = C(Q− T ) + I
(
rB + hL
1− 1/ , rB
)
+G (14)
H + Lg = Cu
(
Q,
(1− τ)rB − hD
1 + 1/η
, rB
)
+ τD
(
Q,
(1− τ)rB − hD
1 + 1/η
, rB
)
(15)
This model can be studied under two assumptions. On the one hand, we can
assume that authorities peg the monetary base M0. Then the system (14)-(15)
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determines Q and rB, and we obtain rL and rD from (6) and (7). On the other
hand, we can assume that monetary policy consists in pegging the interest rate
ρ = rB in the interbank market. In this case, the system (14)-(15) determines
Q and H, and also rB and rD from (6)-(7) : clearly, the monetary base is now
endogenous.
3 Monetary policy by pegging monetary base
We present here the main results (see the appendix for computations).
3.1 The LM curve
Equation (14) implicitly defines a decreasing relation between Q and rB = ρ that
can be called (CC) curve. In some sense, in our model, CC plays a role similar
to that of the standard IS curves, On each point of this curve, the two markets
for the output and for loans are simultaneously equilibrated (see for instance
Bernanke-Blinder (1988)).
Equation (15) defines the LM curve that can be upward or downward sloping.
In fact, the slope of LM is positive if and only if
A =
(
∂Cu
∂rB
+ τ
∂D
∂rB
+
∂Cu
∂rD
1− τ
1 + 1/η
)
+
∂D
∂rD
τ(1− τ)
1 + 1/η
is negative, i.e. if ∂D
∂rD
is not too large (note that the first term in brackets is
negative). The economic intuition is the following : if output Q increases, the
money demand (Cu + D) also increases, as well as the demand for the money
base (Cu + τD). In the standard IS-LM model (where the interest rate rD
is exogenously fixed), equilibrium of the money market requires an increase of
ρ = rB. In the present model, if
∂D
∂rD
is sufficiently large, it is possible that a
decrease in ρ = rB, and a corresponding decrease rD =
(1−τ)rB−hD
1+1/η
, leads to a
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decrease in deposits D, which reequilibrates the money and the base markets :
in this case, LM is downward sloping.
3.2 Economic policies : liquidity trap and crowding out
Recall that if we consider the determinant ∆ = (1 − CQ)A + JF where J =
∂I
∂rL
/(1− 1/) + ∂I
∂rB
< 0 and F = ∂Cu
∂Q
+ τ ∂D
∂Q
> 0, the effects of economic policies
are given by
dQ
dG
=
A
∆
, (19)
drB
dG
= −F
∆
, (20)
dQ
dM0
=
J
∆
, (21)
drB
dM0
=
1− CQ
∆
. (22)
Clearly, all these expressions can be positive or negative. Results are summa-
rized in Table 1.
A < 0 0 > 0 A˜ > 0
LM slope > 0 < 0 < 0
∆ < 0 < 0 > 0
Monetary policy
dQ
dM0
> 0
drB
dM0
< 0
dQ
dM0
< 0
drB
dM0
> 0
Fiscal Policy
dQ
dG
> 0
drB
dG
> 0
dQ
dG
< 0
drB
dG
> 0
dQ
dG
> 0
drB
dG
< 0
Table 1 : monetary and fiscal policies
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It would be tedious to go into the details of all possible cases. The main
results can be presented distinguishing two cases.
1. A < 0
In this case the interest rate rD does not have a significant impact on
deposits. Hence LM is upward sloping. Then the standards results of
IS−LM model are qualitatively preserved. Yet we can make some remarks
on monetary policy and fiscal policy.
• In this model with financial intermediation, monetary policy impacts
the real sector simultaneously through two channels. First, the stan-
dard money (or financial) channel : an increase in the monetary base
leads to a decrease is the interest rates ρ and rB. Second, the credit
channel : due to the competition between banks, the decrease in the
interest rate rB on financial markets induces a decrease in rL, the
loans interest rate (see (6) above). This competition also leads to a
decrease of rD, the deposits interest rate (see (7) above). In fact, as
we have seen above, simultaneous competition on the loans market
and the deposits market leads to a positive correlation between the
three interest rates on financial market (ρ = rB), loans market (rL)
and deposits markets (rD).
Finally, it can be seen that when ∂D
∂rD
increases (the slope of LM de-
creases), monetary policy is more efficient : see the proof in appendix.
For instance, if the base M0 increases, as we have seen before, all the
interest rates decrease. If rD has an important impact on D, house-
holds want to hold less money and more bonds, which reinforces the
decrease of rB, so that monetary policy is more efficient.
11
Remark : it is possible to obtain here a more standard credit channel
by assuming that banks cannot lend or borrow on financial markets.
In this case, their assets are L + τD and their liabilities are D + H.
If we assume that Cu = cM, 0 < c < 1, we obtain M = kM0, where
k = 1/(c + τ(1 − c)) is the usual monetary base multiplier. Then we
have L = D(1 − τ) + H = (1 − τ)(1 − c)kM0 + H, where M0 and H
are pegged by the central bank, which thus controls the loan supply
L.
• If A is negative, fiscal policy has standard effects on output and the
interest rate rB (see table 1). Here also, all interest rates are positively
correlated. But, when ∂D
∂rD
increases, fiscal policy is less efficient (see
the proof in appendix).
For instance, if G increases, there can be a very small increase in Q,
because rB and rD simultaneously go up. Therefore the money market
is reequilibrated and private investment is crowded out.
2. A > 0
If the interest rate rD has a significant impact on deposits, LM is downward
sloping and the model exhibits non standard results. As can be seen in
Table 1 (see also appendix), there are two cases. The first case is when
A < A˜ = −JF
1−CQ : ∆ is negative, i.e. CC is (in absolute value) steeper than
LM . In the other case, where A > A˜, ∆ is positive and CC is less steep
than LM . Consider two characteristics cases :
If 0 < A < A˜, fiscal policy leads to (see figure 1) :
dQ
dG
< 0 and
drB
dG
> 0
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Figure 1 : fiscal policy and strong crowding out
In this case, an increase in G leads to a recession because there is strong
crowding out of private demand. In fact, since Q decreases, money de-
mand decreases, thus the monetary base demand also decreases. But, as
rB increases, rD also increases, and here, the demand of deposits strongly
increases. At last, the market of monetary base is reequilibrated.
If A > A˜, monetary policy leads to (see figure 2) :
dQ
dM0
< 0 and
drB
dM0
> 0
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Figure 2 : monetary policy and liquidity trap
In the standard IS−LM model, an increase of monetary base M0 leads to
a decrease in rB and an increase in Q. Thus money demand increases and
the base market is reequilibrated. Here, the same monetary policy leads to
a recession and an increase in interest rates : the decrease in Q and the
increase in rB lead to a decrease in money demand, but the increase in rD
has such a strong positive effect on money demand that the monetary base
market is reequilibrated. Here we observe a mechanism that can be called
the liquidity trap because, on account of the increase of rD, all the new
money stays inside deposits.
4 Monetary policy by pegging interest rate
If the central bank pegs the interest rate ρ on the interbank market, the two
endogenous variables given by (14)-(15) are Q and H. Of course rL and rD are
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still given by (6) and (7). The main point here is that the LM curve disappears
since the monetary base is endogenous. Then it is easy to study monetary and
fiscal policies in this context (see computations in appendix).
4.1 Monetary policy
If, for instance, the central bank lowers ρ, there is an increase of I. Therefore
there is an increase of Q. As before, due to competition between banks, all
the interest rates (rB, rL, rD) increase. Thus monetary policy affects economic
activity by the two previous channels : the money channel (rB decreases) and
the credit channel (rL decreases). Let us notice that the monetary base Cu +H
and the quantity of money Cu +D can increase or decrease because the fall of rD
reduces the demand of deposits. In the same way, the loans demand Ld(rL, rB)
can also increase or decrease because rL and rB both decrease.
4.2 Fiscal policy
Fiscal policy leads to very simple but surprising results. The main point here
is that the government-purchases multiplier ∆Q/∆G = 1/(1− CQ) is maximum
because the interest rates, specially rB and rL, are constant. Certainly, this result
is trivial in the standard IS − LM model. But in our model where banks create
money, it is useful to understand how the bonds market equilibrates after the
government borrowings.
Let us assume that there is no new tax and no seignoriage. Then the new
expenditures ∆G are financed by a new flow of bonds. Since the interest rates are
unchanged, the investment I is constant and we have ∆Q = ∆C + ∆G, namely
∆Q−∆C = ∆G : the flow of new bonds is buyed by households.
Let us now consider the consolidated balance sheet of the central bank and
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the commercial banks. Assets are Lg and L. Liabilities are M = Cu + D and
Bb. Since Lg and L are constant, we have ∆M + ∆Bb = 0, with ∆M = −∆Bm
in the households portfolio. Thus we obtain
∆M = −∆Bb = −∆Bm (23)
where the new endogenous money is nearly given by ∆M '
(
∂Cu
∂Q
+ ∂D
∂Q
)
∆Q =(
∂Cu
∂Q
+ ∂D
∂Q
)
∆G
1−CQ .
After the increase in G and Q, households hold fewer bonds (∆Bb < 0) and
more money (∆M > 0). But this new endogenous money is a new resource for
banks which can decrease their borrowings on the financial market (∆Bb < 0).
The financial market can thus be reequilibrated without any variation of the
interest rate.
5 Conclusion
In the standard macroeconomic models, it is generally assumed that the gov-
ernment creates money and that lenders and borrowers can have all access to a
perfect financial market. In fact, we know that deposits are held by banks, which
moreover have an important intermediation role. The model we have presented
here introduced these two characteristics of banks activity in a standard general
equilibrium framework with five types of agents (firms, households, banks, cen-
tral bank, government) and five goods (output, deposits, loans, monetary base,
bonds). The main result of the competition between banks in the two markets
of deposits and loans is that the different interest rates (on financial market,
deposits and loans) are positively correlated equilibrium.
This analysis allows to study the effects of fiscal and monetary policies when
the central bank can use two types of monetary policy : pegging monetary base of
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pegging interest rate. Results are often non standard and sometimes surprising.
However, several formulas in the text are ”black boxes” (see for instance the
costs in bank’s profit or the investment demand (8)). At these places of the model,
it is probably possible to introduce more formally the modern ideas on the credit
channel, in particular by studying in detail the complex relations between firms
and banks.
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6 Appendix
The basic model is
Q = C(Q− T ) + I
(
rB + hL
1− 1/ , rB
)
+G (14)
H + Lg = Cu
(
Q,
(1− τ)rB − hD
1 + 1/η
, rB
)
+ τD
(
Q,
(1− τ)rB − hD
1 + 1/η
, rB
)
(15)
with
rL =
rB + hL
1− 1/ , (6)
rD =
(1− τ)rB − hD
1 + 1/η
(7)
and rB = ρ.
6.1 Monetary policy by pegging monetary base
Differentiating the system (14)-(15), we obtain
dQ(1− CQ)− drBJ = dG− CQdT
dQF + drBA = dM0
where
J =
∂I
∂rL
/
(1− 1/) + ∂I
∂rB
< 0,
F =
∂Cu
∂Q
+ τ
∂D
∂Q
> 0,
and
A =
(
∂Cu
∂rB
+ τ
∂D
∂rB
+
∂Cu
∂rD
1− τ
1 + 1/η
)
+
∂D
∂rD
τ(1− τ)
1 + 1/η
which can be positive or negative.
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The slope of CC is
dQ
drB
∣∣∣∣∣
CC
=
J
1− CQ < 0 (16)
and the LM one is
dQ
drB
∣∣∣∣∣
LM
=
−A
F
(17)
Thus we have
dQ
drB
∣∣∣∣∣
LM
> 0⇔ A < 0 (18)
If we denote by ∆ = (1 − CQ)A + JF the determinant of the differentiated
system, we can study the effects of fiscal and monetary policies.
Let us consider a fiscal policy such that dG = dBg. Then we obtain
dQ
dG
=
A
∆
=
1
1− CQ + JF/A (19)
and
drB
dG
=
−F
∆
(20)
If we consider a monetary policy characterized by a variation of the monetary
base, we have
dQ
dM0
=
J
∆
(21)
and
drB
dM0
=
1− CQ
∆
(22)
In order to characterize the effects of these policies, it is useful to distinguish
two cases : A < 0 and A > 0.
First case : A < 0 (LM has a positive slope)
In this case, ∆ = (1− CQ)A+ JF is negative since we know that J < 0 and
F > 0. Therefore we have
dQ
dG
> 0 ;
drB
dG
> 0 ;
dQ
dM0
> 0 ;
drB
dM0
< 0 ;
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Let us examine how the effects of fiscal and monetary policies are affected by
the sensitiveness of deposits demand to interest rate rD.
First, it is clear that, if ∂D
∂rD
increases, then A increases (the slope of LM
decreases). Thus we have
• dQ
dG
decreases and drB
dG
increases, with
lim
A→0
dQ
dG
= 0
and
lim
A→0
drB
dG
=
−1
J
.
• dQ
dM0
increases and drB
dM0
decreases, with
lim
A→0
dQ
dM0
=
1
F
.
and
lim
A→0
∣∣∣∣∣ drBdM0
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1− CQJF .
In other words, when ∂D
∂rD
increases, fiscal policy is less efficient and mone-
tary policy is more efficient.
Second case : A > 0 (LM has a negative slope).
In this case, ∆ can be negative or positive and we must distinguish two sub-
cases according to A is smaller or greater than A˜ = −JF
1−CQ .
1. A < A˜
In this sub-case, ∆ is negative. This can be interpreted by the fact that CC
is (in absolute value) more sloped than LM since A < −JF
1−CQ ⇔ −J1−CQ > AF
(see (16) and (17)). Then we have
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• dQ
dG
< 0 and drB
dG
> 0 for fiscal policy,
• dQ
dM0
> 0 and drB
dM0
< 0 for monetary policy.
2. A > A˜
In this sub-case ∆ is positive, that can be interpreted by the fact that CC
is (in absolute value) less sloped than LM . Then we have
• dQ
dG
> 0 and drB
dG
< 0 for fiscal policy,
• dQ
dM0
< 0 and drB
dM0
> 0 for monetary policy.
6.2 Monetary policy by pegging interest rate
From (14)-(15) we obtain
• Monetary policy
dQ
dρ
=
∂I
∂rL
/(1− 1/) + ∂I
∂rB
1− CQ < 0
dH
dρ
=
(
∂Cu
∂Q
+ τ
∂D
∂Q
)
dQ
dρ
+
(
∂Cu
∂rD
(1− τ)
1 + 1/η
+
∂Cu
∂rB
+ τ
∂D
∂rB
)
+τ
∂D
∂rD
· (1− τ)
1 + 1/η
The first and the second terms are negative. But the third one is positive
because ∂D
∂rD
is positive. Thus dH
dρ
can be positive or negative.
In the same way, it can be easily verified that dM
dρ
= d(Cu+D)
dρ
can be positive
or negative.
• Fiscal policy
dQ
dG
=
1
1− CQ > 0
dM
dG
=
(
∂Cu
∂Q
+
∂D
∂Q
)
dQ
dG
> 0
dH
dG
=
(
∂Cu
∂Q
+ τ
∂D
∂Q
)
dQ
dG
> 0
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